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p ICT uRE a map of the United States. Each state is marked out in
- red or yellow or green or orange, in between the blue that is saved
for the oceans and the dull white of Mexico and Canada. Now imagine a
series of walls ten miles high running along the boundaries of each block
of color and shutting every state off from the states around it. It will
be helpful to remember that problems of interstate taxation are treated
by the law very much as though those imaginary walls were real.
Now the average man knows well enough what a tax is. It is a sum
of money that must be paid to a government because the payer owns
something or does something or gets something. If the tax is "on" any-
thing it is on the man or the company that must pay the tax. Some-
times the tax is a flat tax, like a two dollar school tax that must be paid
by everyone who lives in the school district. More often the amount
of the tax is measured according to the value of whatever the taxpayer
owns or does or gets that makes him have to pay the tax. So much
seems sufficiently simple.
But the lawyer, unfortunately, does not see it this way. To him
it is far more complicated. In the law, the tax is "on" the person who
pays it only when there is nothing else "on" which the tax can be said
to lie. If a man is taxed because he has an oil well, the tax is said to be
"on" the oil well. If he is taxed because he makes money from the
oil well, the tax is "on" the income he makes, or maybe "on" the privi-
lege of making it. If he is taxed because he sells oil from his well, the
tax is "on" the sales. If he or his son is taxed because he leaves the well
to his son at his death, the tax is "on" the handing over of the well.
Again, a man who drives his own car must usually pay three taxes a
year-one because he owns the car, one to get license plates so the car
may be used on the roads, and one for a driver's license so that he can
drive it without being arrested. He has little doubt that the three taxes
are on him; he has to pay them. But to the law, the first tax is "on"
the car, the second "on" the privilege of running the car on the public
roads, and the third "on" the personal privilege of driving it.
Now this business of finding out what a tax is "on" may seem a harm-
less little game of words. But in law it is a serious business. The law
calls the thing the tax is "on" the "subject" of the tax. And it is when
the "subject" of a tax can not readily be pinned down to one state that
there arises a problem of interstate taxation. For a problem in inter-
state taxation is nothing more than the dispute which comes up when
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more than one state wants to tax the same person or company for own-
ing or doing or getting the same thing.
It is then that the law seems to put those high walls around the bor-
ders of the states. For the law goes at an interstate tax problem in this
way: First it decides just what the disputed tax is "on," or the "subject"
of the tax. Then it decides whether this "subject" has a "situs" in the
state that is trying to collect the tax. If so, the tax and its "subject"
are said to be within the state's "jurisdiction." And when the law says
that a state has "jurisdiction" to collect a certain tax because the "sub-
ject" of the tax has a "situs" in the state, it is really putting within the
imaginary walls of that state the thing that the taxpayer owns or does
or gets and for which he is being taxed.
Now it is quite a feat to put, for the time being, within the boundaries
of one state something that a man owns or does or gets in several states.
And it is even more of a feat if that something is so abstract-such as
the privilege of passing on at death the right to receive dividends from
a corporation-that it is pretty hard to give it a geographical location
at all. But this does not bother the law. The law takes it as a matter
of course that problems of interstate taxation are to be decided by giv-
ing the "subject" of the tax, no matter how abstract nor how ubiquitous,
a "situs" inside or outside the walls that surround a state's "jurisdic-
tion."
There are two kinds of interstate tax problems-those that have been
answered and those that have not been answered. Sometimes the an-
swers are changed, but until they are, the old answers still hold good.
The answers are given by the Supreme Court which, so far as problems
in interstate taxation are concerned, embodies the law. A list of the
Supreme Court's latest answers, which must always be coupled with
the names of cases in which these answers were given, makes up what
lawyers call the Law. Here it is.
In the first place, interstate tax problems almost always come up in
connection with three kinds of taxes-what the law usually calls prop-
erty taxes, inheritance taxes, and income taxes. Property taxes are
those that a person or company must pay for having or owning some-
thing, and are measured according to the value of the thing the person
or company is taxed for having. Inheritance taxes are those that must
be paid when a person dies and leaves something he owned to somebody
else, and are measured by the value of whatever the person leaves when
he dies. Income taxes are those that a person or company has to pay
for making money, and are measured according to how much money the
person or company makes. Sometimes the law calls a property tax
or an income tax by some other name, such as a "franchise" tax "meas-
ured by" property or income, but so far as problems of interstate taxa-
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tion are concerned, the name makes no difference. The three kinds
of taxes might just as well be called Have taxes, Die-and-Leave taxes,
and Earn taxes.
The Law of the Have Taxes
There are two kinds of Have taxes, depending on what it is that the
person or company has and is being taxed for having. If it is something
substantial and definite, like a house or a flock of sheep or a gallon of
whiskey, the law calls it a tangible. If it is a right to have or get money
or something in the future, even though it may be written down on a
piece of paper, like an I. 0. U. or a mortgage or a share of stock or a
bank account, the law calls it an intangible. A tangible, then, is really
an Object and an intangible a Right.
Now the easiest sort of interstate tax problem comes up when a man
lives in one state and owns an object in another state. Which state can
tax him for owning it? The law says first of all that the tax is 'on"
the object. The object, then, is the "subject" of the tax. The "subject"
has a "situs" in the state where the object actually is. That state has
"jurisdiction." It can tax the man because he owns the object.' The
state where he lives can not tax him.' The law says that the excuse
for this is that the state where the object is protects and takes care of
the object. Of course, the state where the man lives protects and takes
care of him. But it is perfectly clear that, once it is decided that the
tax is "on" the object, only the state where the object is can tax the
man for owning it. Remember that there is a wall around that state's
borders.
But there are some sorts of objects which do not know that the law
has put walls between the states and which move, in spite of those legal
walls, from one state to another. Sometimes, they are always on the
move, like freight cars. Sometimes, like goods being delivered from
place to place, they move only once. In either case they create inter-
state tax problems, for the law must decide which states may tax their
owners for owning them.
If, like freight cars, the objects are always moving, the law uses
what it calls a "unit rule" to decide what states may tax the owners.
The "unit rule" lets a state through which the objects keep moving in
and out pretend that part of the objects are always in that state. So
if a lot of freight cars owned by one owner keep moving through a
state, the state may figure out how many cars are usually in the state
1. Carstairs v. Cochran, 193 U. S. 10 (1904); Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia,
198 U. S. 299 (1905).
2. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U. S. 341 (1905);
Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905).
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while moving through it, and may pretend that that many cars are
always sitting inside the state and not moving. Of course this gives
that number of cars a permanent "situs" in the state, and the state can
tax their owner for owning them. In this way the law keeps its state
walls intact by pretending that part of a lot of moving objects are always
sitting in each of the states through which all of them are always mov-
ing.
But suppose the objects have a home base and very seldom move into
other states; or suppose when they move they do not go through other
states-like a fleet of ships. Then those other states can no longer use
the "unit rule," because they can no longer say that part of the objects
are always moving through. And then and only then the law says that
the state of the home base may tax the owner for owning all the ob-
jects.4 This is not just because the objects have a home base. For if
other states could pretend that part of the objects were always in them,
the state of the home base would have to pretend too, and it could
only tax the owner for owning some of the objects, not all of them.5
It is because the law must put all of the objects between walls so that
their owner can be taxed for owning all of them, and if the law can not
divide them up between a lot of states, the state of the home base seems
the best place to put them.
Suppose, however, the objects do not move through states and have
no home base either, like a fleet of ships almost always on the seas.
Then at last the law lets the state where the owner lives, or if the owner
is a company, where the company was set up, tax that owner for owning
the objects.' This is a little awkward for the law, for, remember, the
tax is "on" the objects and not "on" the owner, and the objects are very
definite things. But the law has no other place to put them. So it re-
luctantly puts them inside the walls of the state where the owner lives,
even though the objects be sea-going ships and the state be in the middle
of the prairies a thousand miles from the coast.
Next come objects which do not make a habit of moving but which
happen to make a trip from state to state, like goods on their way to
be finished or delivered or sold. The state to which they are sent can
of course, after they get there, tax their owner for owning them, for by
that time they have a "situs" in that state and the tax is "on" them.7
3. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 (1891); American Refrigar-
ator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U. S. 70 (1899).
4. New York Central Ry. v. Miller, 202 U. S. 584 (1906); see Hays v. Pacific Mail
Steamship Co., 17 How. 596 (U. S. 1854); Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471 (U. S. 1872).
5. Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U. S. 158 (1933).
6. Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63 (1911).




How about the state from which they start their journey? The law
says that that state may tax their owner until the goods are started on
their trip to another state. Sometimes it is a bit hard to tell whether
the goods have really started their trip or are just moving around inside
the state getting ready to start. But the law is clear. Before they start,
the state may tax their owner." After they start, they are already out-
side the state's wall although they have not yet crossed its border.'
Goods sent from state to state often go through other states on their
way and sometimes those states try to tax the owner. But the law says
that goods that are actually moving through a state are not within its
walls, just as they are not within the walls of the state from which they
are sent after they have started moving to another state. Suppose, how-
ever, the goods stop for a while in a half-way state. If the reason they
stop is to help them keep on moving, as to be shifted from a train to a
truck or from a pipeline to a tank car, then the law says that they are
really still moving and so are still not inside the state's walls, and so
'the state can not tax their owner.1° But if the reason the goods stop is not
to help them to keep moving but some other reason, as to be weighed
or marked or sold, then the weighing or marking or selling brings the
goods within the state's walls and the state may tax their owner.11 Still
this is true only when the goods actually stop in the state to have some-
thing done to them. If they keep moving through the state while they
are being weighed or marked or sold, then the fact that they are moving
keeps the fact that they are being weighed or marked or sold from
bringing them inside the state's walls. 12
If it happens then that the states through which goods are moving
can not tax their owner for owning them, can the state where he lives do
it instead, as it can with ships on the seas? This is one of the unanswered
,problems of interstate taxation. At least one state has done it;1" but
although the Supreme Court has never actually said no to this kind of
tax because it has never had a case dealing with just this kind of tax,
it-has hinted no,14 and usually that is enough. So much for the Have
taxes on people and companies because they own Objects.
The problems get more complicated when states want to tax people
8. Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 917 (1886); Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon, 188 U. S.
82 (1§03)'.
9. Champlain Realty Co. v. Town of Brattleboro, 260 U. S. 366 (1922); Hughes
Brothers Timber Co. v. Minnesota, 272 U. S. 469 (1926).
10. Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial, 279 U. S. 95 (1929).
11. General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S. 211 (1908); Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U. S. S04
(1913); Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S. 1 (1933).
12. Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U. S. 1 (1903).
13. Carlos Ruggles Lumber Co. v. Commonwealth, 261 Mass. 445, 158 N. E. 897 (1927).
14. See Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U. S. 504, 511 (1913).
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because they own, not definite objects, but Rights, often written on
pieces of paper, like stocks and bonds and personal notes and insurance
policies. The law still says the tax is "on0 the right, not on the owner.
But it is not so easy to find a definite "situs" in one state or another for
a thing so abstract as a right. It might seem that the simplest solution,
when the right is written down on a piece of paper as most rights are,
would be to attach the right to the piece of paper, treat the piece of
paper like an object, and give it a "situs" where it actually is. But this
is just the one solution that the law refuses to follow." The law says that
the right is something more than the piece of paper and that it must have
a "situs" of its own which is in no way connected with where the piece
of paper happens to be.
A right, says the law, is attached to the person or company that owns
the right. Its "situs" is in the state where the person lives or where the
company was set up or "incorporated." That state can always tax the
owner of the right for owning it, no matter where any piece of paper
connected with the right may be."0 This is not just because the person
who must pay the tax lives in that state, for the tax, remember, is not
"ton" him. It is because the right which he owns and which is the "sub-
ject" of the tax, being attached to him, has its own "situs" in the state
where he happens to live. And even if the right is a bond of a nation-
wide corporation and the paper bond itself is kept in a foreign country,
the right is safely within the walls of the owner's state so that that state
may tax him for owning it.
Yet the law realizes that a right is not a definite and substantial thing
like an object. So the law once in a while, in spite of the state walls,
lets a right be in more than one state at one and the same time. If
rights are regularly used by their owner in business in another state,
as by being accounted for and managed in a branch office in the other
state, or like bonds or insurance policies left in the other state as securi-
ty, or an account in a bank in the other state, then the law gives these
rights a special or "business situs" in the other state. And the other
state, along with the owner's home state, can then tax the owner for
owning the rights.'7 The reason for this is not that pieces of paper con-
nected with the rights may be kept in the other state; for, remember,
a right is always separate from its piece of paper. And so the other state
15. Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392 (1907). Cf. Selliger v. Kentucky, 213 U. S. 20O
(1909).
16. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491 (1879); Hawley v. Malden, 232 U. S. 1 (1914);
Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. City of Louisville, 245 U. S. 54 (1917).
17. Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133 (1900); State Board of A& ssors v.
Comptoir National D 'Escompte, 191 U. S. 388 (1903). Cf. New Orleans v. Stempel, 175
U. S. 309 (1899).
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may tax an owner for rights used regularly in business there, even
though the papers may be kept somewhere else'
8 or the rights not written
down on paper at all.19
Then there are certain kinds of rights that always have a special
"situs" other than their regular "situs" in the state where their owner
lives. Shares of stock in a corporation have a special "situs" in the state
where the corporation was set up. 0 This only means of course that
that state, as well as the state where the owner lives, can tax the owner
for owning the stock. The law says that this is because the state where
the corporation was set up is responsible for there being any stock at all.
Yet this reasoning never holds good for objects; only rights can be inside
the walls of more than one state at one time. Mortgages on land or
buildings may have a special "situs" in the state where the land or build-
ings actually are.2 The law thinks this kind of right so firmly attached
to the land or buildings that it never really leaves them. Of course, like
all other rights, a mortgage is also attached to its owner, so if he lives
in one state and owns a mortgage on land or buildings in another state,
both states can tax him for owning it.
A queer kind of right is the extra amount that the rails of a railroad
or the wires of a telephone company or such are worth, because they
are part of one big system and not just disconnected objects. This sort
of right is said to be attached to the rails or wires just as a mortgage is
attached to its land. And the states through which the rails or wires run
can each tax their owner for part of the extra amount that all the rails or
wires together are worth.22 Just as with freight cars, the states use the
"unit rule" to divide up that extra amount and pretend that part of it
is in each state, although actually it is attached to all the rails and wires
in all the states taken together.
The Have taxes get most complicated when the thing that an owner is
taxed for having is held in trust by one person or company for another
person or company. The law says first of all that the thing is really
owned by the person or company that holds the thing in trust, or the
trustee, because even though the trustee has the thing only for the bene-
fit of somebody else, who is called the cestui, still it is the trustee who
really has the thing that is held in trust. If the thing held in trust is
18. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. City of New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395 (1907).
19. Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance Co. v. Orleans Assessors, 221 U. S. 346
(1911).
20. Corry v. Baltimore, 196 U. S. 466 (1905).
21. Savings & Loan Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421 (1898).
22. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 439 (1894);
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Taggart, 163 U. S. 1 (1896); Adams Expres Co. v. Ohio
State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194 (1897).
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an object, then, as with other objects, the state where the object is can
tax the trustee for owning it. And if the thing held in trust is a right,
then, as with other rights, it is attached to its owner, the trustee, and the
state where he lives can tax him for owning it. But if the thing held in
trust is a right, then it has been claimed that the state where the cestui
lives should also be allowed to tax, on the theory that rights held in trust
are really attached to the cestui because, though they are held by the
trustee, they are held for the benefit of the cestui. Of course the Supreme
Court answered no, rights can not be attached to two kinds of owners
at the same time and the real owner is the trustee.2 But the Supreme
Court realized that, when a thing is held in trust, the cestui for whom it
is held in trust has a special kind of right in what he is going to get
in the future from the thing that is now held in trust for him. And the
Supreme Court hinted that maybe, then, the state where the cestui lives
could tax him for owning this special kind of right, even though it can
not tax him for owning the regular rights, like stocks and bonds, that
are held in trust and owned by the trustee.2 4 This is still an unanswered
problem.
Then suppose a man puts rights in trust for his own benefit and ar-
ranges the trust so that he really manages the trustee who manages the
rights. Can the state where the man lives then tax him for owning
the rights, not because he is the cestui, but because in managing the
trustee he also makes himself the owner of the rights in place of the
trustee? Or can the state where a trust is set up and managed get in a
tax, on the ground that the rights held in trust have a "business situs"
there? These are other examples of the unanswered problems that can
come up under the Have taxes, because the law is made by giving "sub-
jects" a "situs" inside the walls of state "jurisdiction." And except for
still other unanswered problems that may some day be raised, here ends
the interstate Law of the Have taxes.
The Law of the Die-and-Leave Taxes
The next big group of taxes causing interstate problems are the Die-
and-Leave taxes, which the law calls inheritance taxes, or sometimes
estate taxes, death taxes, or transfer taxes. These are nothing more
than the taxes that must be paid when someone dies and leaves some-
thing he owned to somebody else. Sometimes they must be paid by the
person to whom the thing is left, and sometimes they must be paid out
of money or other things left by the person who died. But so far as
23. Brooke v. Norfolk, 277 U. S. 27 (1928); Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v.
V'rginia, 280 U. S. 83 (1929).
24. See Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. 10rginia, 280 U. S. 83, 95 (1929).
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interstate problems are concerned it does not matter to the law who has
to pay the tax. For the tax, remember, is not on the person who pays
it. The tax is "on" the handing over of the thing from one person to
another. So the law is only interested in giving this business of handing
over, which is the "subject" of the tax, a "situs" inside the walls of some
state so that state can do the taxing.
Now the law of the Die-and-Leave taxes used to be very much the
same as the law of the Have taxes. So, when the things left by a person
who died were rights, and sometimes even when they were objects, more
than one state could ask for taxes. But the Supreme Court decided a
few years ago that, though a right was so abstract that it might be inside
the walls of more than one state at the same time, a handing-over was
much more definite and could not be two places at once. So when the
"subject" of a tax is not a right itself, as with the Have taxes, but the
handing over of a right or an object, as with the Die-and-Leave taxes,.
only one state can tax. And this is true even though, for example, a
man who lived in one state happens to die in another state, and leaves
to a person in a third state some stock of a corporation that was set up in
a fourth state and does business in forty-eight states. This, then, is
one of the places where the law has changed the answer to an interstate
problem.
The law of the Die-and-Leave taxes is very simple today. If a man
dies and leaves an object to somebody else, the law says the handing
over of the object takes place inside the walls of the state where the
object actually is when the man dies, and only that state can collect
a tax.25 If a man dies and leaves a right, instead of an object, to some-
body else, that right was so attached to the man who owned it that it
stays in the state where he used to live, is handed over inside the walls.
of that state, and only that state can tax.2 ' And that is just about all
there is to the interstate Law of the Die-and-Leave taxes, as it stands.
today.
Of course, there are many other problems but they are all unanswered.
If a man dies and leaves a right to somebody else, and the right has.
been used regularly in business in another state so that it has a "business.
situs" there, can that state tax instead of the state where the man lived
before he died? The Supreme Court itself says that this is a problem.
that it has not answered.2 7 The same kind of problem comes up if the
right that a man dies and leaves is a mortgage on land or buildings,
25. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
26. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930); Baldwin v. Mis.-
souri, 281 U. S. 586 (1930); First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932).
Cf. Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1 (1928).
27. See First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 331 (1932).
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which was of course attached to the land or buildings as well as to the
owner, and so may have been in two states at the same time;2 1 or if the
thing that is handed over is a right that was held in trust.P In these
cases and in many more, the Supreme Court will have to decide whether
the handing over of the right takes place in one state or the other, be-
cause it has already decided that a handing-over can only be in one state
at a time.
Some people think that the Supreme Court will change the answers
back again and let more than one state tax when a man dies and leaves
a right to somebody else. They have several reasons for thinking this.
The legal reason is that a handing over of a right is just as indefinite as
a right itself, and so there is no reason why it should not be in more
than one state at the same time. The real reason is that people who
die and leave rights are usually rich men, and there is no reason why only
one state should be allowed to tax a rich man for dying and leaving
something. Also, some of the states have strongly objected to not being
allowed to tax the way they used to before the Supreme Court stopped
them. Finally, some of the members of the Supreme Court itself did
not want to change the answers when the rest of the Court changed
them. But all this has nothing to do with the Law. The Law is that only
one state can tax when a man dies and leaves something to somebody
else.
The Law of the Earn Taxes
Now the hardest problems come up when more than one state tries
to tax the same person or company for making the same money. These
taxes "on"' income, or Earn taxes, are newer than the Have taxes and
the Die-and-Leave taxes, so many of the problems are still unanswered.
The taxes can be divided into two kinds - those on people, and those
on companies.
First, the state where a man lives may tax him for making money,
even though he makes it by doing work or business in another state
or out of things that he owns in another state ° This is because the
state where he lives protects and takes care of him while he is spending
the money, no matter where he makes it. Of course this state also takes
care of him while he is owning objects in another state but can not tax
him for owning them. This is one of the differences between a Have
tax and an Earn tax. The Have tax is "on" the object and the Earn
28. See Baldwin v. Mlssouri, 281 U. S. 586, 594 (1930).
29. Cf. Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625 (1916); Bates v. Decree of Judge of Pro-
bate, 131 Ale. 176, 160 AUt. 22 (1932).
30. Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U. S. 12 (1920); Lawrence v. State Tax Commni-mon of
Mississippi, 286 U. S. 276 (1932).
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tax is "on" the making or getting of money, even if it is made out of an
object that is owned in another state.
But the law has also said that a state where a man makes money, by
doing work or business there, or out of things that he owns there, can
tax him for making the money even though he does not live there. 1
This is because that state protects and takes care of the work or the
business or the things out of which the money is made. Now if the
money is made by doing work, or out of objects that are owned, like
coal-mines or cows or taxicabs, it is easy enough to tell where the money
is made. But it is not so easy if the money is made, as so much money
is, out of rights that are owned, like stocks or bonds or mortgages.
For a right, remember, is one of the few things that can be inside the
walls of more than one state at the same time. If so, which state can
tax the man who owns it for making money out of it, or can they all
tax him along with the state where he lives? This is an unanswered
problem.
As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court has never really said that as
many as two states can tax the same man for making the same money,
because it has never really been asked. When it said that the state
where a man lived could tax him, the state where the money was made
was not trying to tax him. And when it said the state where the money
was made could tax a man, the state where he lived was not trying to
tax him. So all the Court has actually said is that either the state where
a man lives or the state where his money is made may tax him for mak-
ing it. It has never said that both states might tax him at the same
time, or, if not, which state may do the taxing. It will probably have
to decide this pretty soon.
A few state courts have tried to guess what the Supreme Court will
decide. They have gone so far as to say that when a man in their state
makes money out of objects he owns in another state, as by renting out
land in the other state, then only the other state should tax him for mak-
ing that money, and the state where he lives should not.8  This, they
say, is because the money he makes is so attached to the object he
makes it out of that it is made in the state where the object is. But if
he makes money by selling an object, like a plot of land, in another
state, then, since he no longer owns the object, the money he makes is
no longer attached to it, and the state where the man lives can tax him
31. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37 (1920); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U. S.
60 (1920).
32. Opinion of the Justices, 84 N. H. 559, 149 Atl. 321 (1930); Pierson v. Lynch, 237
App. Div. 763, 263 N. Y. Supp. 259 (3d Dep't, 1933), aff'd 263 N. Y. 533, 189 N. E, 684
(1933). Cf. Hutchins v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 272 Mass, 422, 172
N. E. 605 (1930).
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for making that money. 3 Of course, what one or two state courts say
can not keep other states from trying to tax a man twice for making the
same money, no matter how he makes it. And until they try, and the
Supreme Court decides about it, that part of the Law is still an unan-
swered problem.
Earn taxes on companies, instead of people, are a little different. The
state where a company is set up corresponds to the state where a per-
son lives. Possibly, as with people, the law would let that state tax
the company for all the money the company makes. But it is a lot
easier for a big company to give up its charter and get set up in another
state than it is for a person to move his home into another state. So the
states have not tried to tax companies for making money just because
the companies are set up in them. The states are afraid that the com-
panies would move to other states which did not try to tax them for all
the money they made.
Many states, however, do tax companies for the money they make in
those states. The law says that this is all right. 1 Now if a company does
all its business in one state, it is easy enough to tell that it makes all its
money in that state. And that state can tax it for making the money
there. But if a big company makes its money by buying or selling or
making or owning things in a lot of states, it is not very easy to tell how
much of the money is made in each of the states. Still the law says that
each state can only tax the company for making as much of the money
as is made in that state.
Here the law lets a state use something very much like the "unit rule,"
which is called an "allocation fraction." 3, An "allocation fraction" is a
fraction made up of sums that the state can count up more easily than it
can count up how much money is made in the state. The top of the
fraction may be the value of all the objects the company owns in the
state, or the total amount of wages the company pays in the state, or
the total value of the goods the company sells in the state; and the
bottom of the fraction will then be, correspondingly, the value of all the
objects the company owns everywhere, or the total amount of all the
wages the company pays, or the total value of all the goods the company
sells. The state then multiplies this fraction times all the money the
company makes, and says that that much of the money was made in
that state. Different states use many different sums in their fractions,
33. Pierson v. Lynch, supra note 32.
34. United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 (1918); Underwood
Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 (1920); Bas, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v.
State Tax Commission, 266 U. S. 271 (1924).
35. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain; Bas, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State
Tax Commission, both supra note 34.
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but the purpose of all of them is to pretend that part of the money a
company makes in a lot of states is made in one state. In this way, the
making of that part of the money is brought inside the walls of that
state so that it can tax the company for making that part of the money.
Sometimes a company claims that it did not make as much money in
a state as the state figured out by using the "allocation fraction." Then
the law says that if the company can prove that it did not make that
much money, it does not have to pay a tax for making that much
money. 6 Of course this is all the company wants. And of course the
company can usually arrange its account books to "prove" this. In thi!
way, a company can say that it makes most of its money in a state that
does not tax it at all for making money, or in a state that, by using an
"allocation fraction," taxes it for making much less money than the com-
pany says it makes in that state when it is trying to get out of taxes in
another state. 7 But this has nothing to do with the law. The law is
only interested in dividing up the money a company makes in a lot of
states, so that it will fit inside the walls of separate states.
Finally, there is one time when the law will not let a company be
taxed at all for making money in a state where the company does busi-
ness and makes money. That is when all the business a company does
in a state is very closely connected with another state, as when all the
goods sold in a state are shipped in directly from another state 88 The
law is not very clear about how close the connection must be. But if
even a very few of the goods sold in a state were made or bought
or stored in that state before they were sold, then the rule does not
work at all. Then the state can tax the company for all the money it
makes in the state, including the money made by selling goods shipped
in directly from another state. So, only when every cent of money a com-
pany makes in a state comes from business that is very closely connected
with other states, does the law say that no part of the money was made
entirely within the walls of any one state. Of couise this is actually
just as true of all the money that is made by every company that does
business in a lot of states. But if the law were to admit this, it could
never very well put walls around the making of money by these com-
panies; and then none of the states could ever tax them for making it.
At any rate, this finishes the Law of interstate tax problems. Of
course there are many other kinds of taxes than Have taxes and Die-
and-Leave taxes and Earn taxes. Probably the commonest is the tax
"on" sales that a person or a company may have to pay for selling some.
36. Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U. S. 123 (1931).
37. See Comment (1931) 40 YALP L. J. 1273.
38. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203 (1925).
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thing, and that is added to the price of the thing sold so that the buyer
really pays the tax. But with all these other taxes, once the law has
said what the tax is "on," it is usually pretty easy to give this "subject"
a "situs" inside some state's walls. Then only that state will so much
as claim the right to tax. And when only one state claims the right to
tax, there is no interstate tax problem.
The Legal Articles
Now a great many very learned articles and even a few books have been
written about the problems of interstate taxation. Most of them try
to explain the answers that the law has given to the answered problems,
and when the answers seem queer the articles try to make them seem
reasonable. A lot of the articles try to figure out the answers to the un-
answered problems, but the writers, not being the Supreme Court, can
only guess. And many of the articles wonder whether some of the pres-
ent answers may not soon be changed.
For instance, they wonder whether the law will change the answers
on the Have taxes, as it did on the Die-and-Leave taxes, so that only
one state will be allowed to tax a man or a company for owning a right.
Sometimes they wonder instead whether the law will change back the
answers on the Die-and-Leave taxes, so that more than one state will
again be allowed to tax a man for dying and leaving a right that he
owned to somebody else. Or they wonder what the law will do with the
Earn taxes, and whether it will really let several states or only one state
tax the same man for making the same money.
All these articles talk about the problems in legal words. For instance,
they argue that a right, when it is the "subject" of a tax, should have
a "situs" in only one state. Or they argue that two states can easily
have "jurisdiction" at the same time, to put a tax "on" the handing down
of something at-a man's death. Or, getting more complicated, they sug-
gest that Earn taxes can have two different kinds of "subjects." Thus
they would call a tax on a man for making money a tax "on" the money
he makes or "on" his privilege of making it. But if he makes the money
39. It has seemed to me unnecessary to clutter this article with references to sicondary
legal materials. Those who want such materials regardless may take for a first do-T2 the
seventeen articles and two books-representing only the more learned contributions of the
last five years--cited in the second footnote of Maurice H. Merrill's article, Jurkicrtion to
Tax-Another Word (1935) 44 YrAL L. J. 582, which incidentally strikes me as a more
able piece of legal analysis than any of those he cites. I have also referred to a Comment,
stpra note 37, because it applies to the details of one of the interstate tax problems, certain
of the notions which are more fully developed in the present article. The article is, after
all (and, I hope, self-evidently), no more than an attempt to clarify the problems by
stating them in words of one economic syllable, and perhaps thus to Simplify their solu-
tion merely by avoiding the fuzziness of legal jargon.
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out of an object that he owns, then they would say that the tax, like a
Have tax, is also "on" the object. In this way, since the tax could have
two "subjects," each "subject" could have a "situs" in a different state
and both states could have "jurisdiction." And all this is just to show
how two states could tax the same man for making the same money.
Now it is true that some of these articles give other reasons for their
arguments and guesses and suggestions. They may say that the "sub-
ject" of a tax should have its "situs" in the state that is most responsi-
ble for taking care of that "subject" or helping to create it or allowing
it to happen at all. In this way "jurisdiction" would depend on "bene-
fit." And "benefit," although it is not always very easy to find and
measure, is at least easier to find and measure than "jurisdiction." Or
the articles may go so far as to say that the reason a "subject" should
have only one "situs" is that it is not fair to tax the same person or com-
pany twice for owning or doing or getting the same thing. Or, on the
other side, they may argue that it is perfectly fair to tax a rich person
or company twice for owning or doing or getting the same thing, espec-
ially when more than one state contributes some "benefit" to the "sub-
ject" of the tax.
But none of the articles, even when they give more sensible reasons
for what they say, seem able to get away from the confusing legal talk
of "subjects" and "situs" and "benefit" and "jurisdiction." They stay
under cover of these words and ideas instead of breaking through or
around them. In short, they take the legal walls between the states
for granted, without stopping to realize that they are there or wonder
why.
The Root of the Problems
What are those legal walls and how did they get there? The law says
that they were built by the Constitution. They were built by the Con-
stitution even though most of the states they surround today were
nothing but uncharted wilderness when the Constitution was written.
Now the Constitution was written almost one hundred and sixty years
ago. In those days, almost all that any man owned was his house and
his land and his livestock and his personal belongings, including maybe
his slaves. Most goods were made in the shops where they were sold.
The doing of business from state to state was a special trade in itself
instead of, as now, an everyday affair involving almost all the business
done in the entire country. So it is not surprising, nor was it stupid,
that the Constitution made each state, jealous as they all were of their
powers, practically supreme within its own boundaries. All the things
that a state might want to tax a man for owning or doing were pretty
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well confined within one state by the nature of affairs, and problems
of interstate taxation rarely if ever arose.
Looking back at the interstate tax problems that arise today, it is not
hard to find their cause. It is the fact that the things men own and the
business men do are of an entirely different nature than they were a
hundred and sixty years ago. Responsible for the change is the devel-
opment of railroads and telephones and coast-to-coast highways, of ma-
chinery and national chain-stores and intricate corporation finance, of
a thousand and one devices that have helped the nation grow to the
point where the average man must look at a map to find out what a
state border is.
Men and business can forget state borders but the law can not forget.
So the law must stretch the Constitution to fit a way of living and car-
rying on trade of which the writers of the Constitution never dreamed.
The law must preserve in itself the state walls which men have ignored.
And when problems arise because of the fact that men have ignored the
walls, the law must somehow find the answers, if it find them at all, in
a Constitution that was written when the walls meant something to men.
At any rate, this is the way the law has treated problems of interstate
taxation.
Is it possible, then, to get rid of the legal walls without scrapping
or side-stepping the Constitution? Out of the strange patchwork that
the law has pieced together in deciding which state may tax and which
state may not tax, can a more up-to-date scheme of taxation be woven
that will do away with both the answered and unanswered problems?
At the least, it is worth a try.
Now the real root of all the interstate tax problems is extremely
simple. The states need money to pay for the countless services they
perform. They can get that money only through taxes. People and
companies do not like to pay taxes even though the states perform serv-
ices for them. Because they do not like to pay taxes, people and com-
panies think it is especially unfair that they should pay taxes to two or
more states for owning or doing or getting the same thing. And it is
because they have partly persuaded the law to agree with them, that the
law has used its walls to decide which states may tax. Is it possible,
then, to be fair both to the states that need the taxes and to the people
and companies that pay them, and still not raise problems for the law
to decide with its walls?
A Plan to End the Problcms
Remember again that the problems come up under the Have taxes,
the Die-and-Leave taxes, and the Earn taxes. Now the Have taxes
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that people and companies must pay for owning objects do not cause
real interstate problems unless the objects are moving. But almost all
objects spend most of their time sitting in one state or another, even
though they are occasionally shipped from state to state and though a
very few of them, like freight cars, are always moving. So the states
would not lose much in taxes if, to end those interstate problems, they
were to tax people and companies for owning only such objects as are
pretty permanently inside a state and not just moving through it. Or
the states might even limit the taxes to objects that can not move, like
land and mines and buildings - what the law calls "realty." In either
way, these Have taxes would be reduced to objects with a real and sta-
tionary location. Nor is it unreasonable for a state where such an object
is to tax its owner, because that is the state which takes care of the
object and where the owner must use it if he use it at all. Yet, even
if the states continue to tax people for owning moving objects, the use
of state walls to decide the few problems arising is neither so important
nor so confusing as when the law gives a "situs" to a right or a handing-
over or a making-of-money.
Now the hardest Have tax problems come up when the law tries to
give a "situs" to a right so that its owner may be taxed for owning it.
But why should a man be taxed for owning a right? He can not wear
it nor eat it nor live in it nor set up shop in it. All that he can do with
it is make money out of it or hand it over to someone else to make
money. And if he were to be taxed only when he makes money out of
it, or dies and leaves it to somebody else to make money, that would
seem to be enough. Certainly it would end the silly business of trying
to put an abstract right into a geographical state, so far as the Have
taxes are concerned. And if the states will not, of their own free will,
stop taxing people and companies for owning rights, there is at least one
way to persuade them to stop, and to do away with the rest of the inter-
state problems as well.
The rest of the interstate problems, and the most important ones,
come up under the Die-and-Leave taxes and the Earn taxes. They are
important because the states have recently been turning more and more
to these taxes, so that a great deal of money is involved and a great
many problems are unanswered. These problems, and even the answered
ones, will soon cause countless disputes, as taxpayers quarrel with states,
and states quarrel with each other, and the law goes calmly on putting
legal walls around the making of money and the handing over of things
at death. The problems will cause disputes, that is, unless they are
never allowed to arise.
Now the federal government,, as well as the states, collects a tax for
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the handing over of things at death, and taxes people and companies for
making money. Why, then, should not the federal government collect
some extra money under its taxes and put this extra money aside to be
,divided up and turned over to the states? The extra federal taxes could
then be made to take the place of the state taxes that cause almost all
the interstate problems. And the money would still come back to the
states to spend.
The plan could be worked out very easily. First, Congress would
pass a bill providing, in legal language - that a stated percentage of
the revenue accruing from federal estate and income taxes be segregated
for distribution to the states. Still in legal language - the bill would
stipulate that payment of a share of the fund be made only to those
states which abolished their own estate or inheritance taxes, their income
taxes, and their property taxes on intangibles. In other words, the fed-
eral government would hand over part of the extra money only to states
that were willing to give up, in return for it, their own Die-and-Leave
-and Earn taxes and their Have taxes on people and companies for own-
ing rights. Very much the same kind of persuasion has been used,
in a reverse way, by the federal government before, when it arranged
to cut off as much as four-fifths of the federal Die-and-Leave tax for
Die-and-Leave taxes paid to a state. Of course, this last arrangement
-would have to be done away with under the new plan. But then the
Die-and-Leave tax rates would not have to be raised to get extra money,
because the four-fifths that has been going to the states would come,
as it did originally, to the federal government. And so only the federal
Earn taxes would have to be increased to get extra money to turn over
to the states under the plan. Finally, the bill in Congress would lay
,down rules for dividing the extra tax money among the forty-eight
states. And the money could best be divided according to a standard
made up of two factors - first, population; and second, the "basic
-wealth" of each state, or the total value of all the permanent objects,
such as land and houses and factories, in the state.
If the bill were passed and the plan put in action, the results would
be fair to everybody concerned. People and companies would never
have to pay taxes to two states for owning or doing or getting the same
thing. As a matter of fact, the extra tax they would pay to the federal
government would in most cases be even smaller than the tax they
might otherwise have to pay to one state, because the expense of collect-
ing the state taxes would be saved. And the states in turn would be
saved the trouble and expense of figuring out and collecting these taxes.
Furthermore, each state would get its fair share of the tax money.
For, the states, remember, need that money only to perform services for,
and take care of people and objects. Surely then, the money should be
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divided according to the number of people and the value of the objects
each state must protect and serve. Moreover, just as people and com-
panies would never have to pay taxes to two states, none of them could
get out of paying these taxes at all by living or doing business in states
that did not tax. And finally, there would be no more use for the state
walls.
Of course, if this plan were proposed in Congress a lot of objections
would be raised. Certain state politicians would howl about state rights
and state pride, but they would not mean that. All they would mean
would be that the plan, if carried out, would cause them or their friends
to lose state jobs. Certainly a state's pride can not be hurt by a mere
offer to hand over money to the state if it will give up other money in
return.
Then the states where most of the rich men live would object strongly.
They would object because they are used to getting a larger share of
the Die-and-Leave and Earn taxes than the federal government would
give them under the plan. Now these states have been getting a larger
share under the state wall system of taxation only because the rich men
happen to live in them. What these states do not care to remember is
that the rich men or their fathers or grandfathers made and make their
money and acquire their rights by doing business, not in one state, but
all over the country or even the world. And in order to talk for more
taxes, these states would keep their eyes closed to the fact that men
have forgotten state boundaries in developing the nation's wealth and
their own personal fortunes.
Under the plan, these states' shares of the tax money would be meas-
ured by the people and the real wealth within their borders. They could
not justly ask for more. And in spite of all objections, it would be just
about impossible for such a state to turn down the federal government's
offer, once the plan was adopted and the offer made. For the federal
government would collect the extra tax money regardless. And the tax-
payers of the state, rather than pay two sets of taxes, would force the
state to join the federal plan.
Finally, the law itself might object to the plan after it was under
way. At least certain lawyers, who make money by handling interstate
tax, problems, would say beforehand that the law would object. But
unless and until the Supreme Court were to call the plan illegal, even
those lawyers could not know. Now the only legal objection that might
lead the Court to turn down the plan is that the federal government
may not, even by merely making offers to the states, take away from
the states the powers that the Constitution promised them. The power
to tax, the objection would run, is one of the most important of the state
powers. Therefore the federal government may not ask the states to
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give up, even of their own free will, part of their taxing powers. But
there is a legal answer to this. For, legally, the states would not be giv-
ing up part of their taxing powers; they would only be refraining from
exercising those powers. And this only means that a state, should it
wish, could at any time turn down the federal government's offer and
start collecting its own taxes again. That no state would ever do this
in no way affects the law.
Any possible legal objection to the plan would really come from a
reluctance to turn over to the federal government full control of an
activity that the states are used to handle for themselves. The argument
is very close to the states' rights idea and is often expressed as a vague
fear of "centralization." But such an objection would come with bad
grace from the law. For it is through the Supreme Court that the law
has, up to now, handled interstate tax problems and told the states
what they might and might not do. And the Supreme Court is, after
all, a part of the federal government itself. Surely it would be more
sensible for the federal government to handle the taxes from the begin-
ning with an orderly plan than to continue to handle them in a piece-
meal way after the states have done their best.
Yet in spite of all this, the law might refuse to let the federal govern-
ment use the plan. For the law is sometimes a willing slave to duty 0
And if the states were allowed to get rid of their Earn taxes and their Die-
and-Leave taxes and their Have taxes for the owning of rights, then
there would be almost no more problems of interstate taxation for the
law to answer, just as there were almost no problems when the Consti-
tution was written. And then the law would no longer have to insist
that there are walls between the blocks of color on a map of the United
States.
40. That a majority of the Supreme Court is willing and anxious to extend and further
complicate the state wall plan of taxation seems apparent from the decision in Serior v.
Braden, handed down on Aray 20, 1935, after this article had gone to press. In that case,
the state of Ohio was forbidden to tax an Ohio resident for maling money out of rights,
represented by certificates in a trust, which owned land both inside ard outside of Ohio.
Although the opinion is confusing, it seems to change the Law of the Earn taxes so that a
man may no longer be taxed by the state in which he lives for making money out of things
in another state. At least the opinion implies that the leading case allowing such a tax
(Maguire v. Trefry, supra, note 30) was later discredited by the one state deci ons on the
Die-and-Leave taxes (supra, note 26), although, as Mr. Justice Stone points out, in an able
dissent joined by justices Brandeis and Cardozo, an even more recent decision (Lawrence
v. State Tax Commission, supra, note 30) upholds the right of a state to tax its reidents
for making money in other states. The fact that in the instant case, at least part of the
money was definitely made in Ohio casts considerable doubt on the exact meaning of the
majority opinion. Thus the law continues to confuse state tax systems with complicated
theories about imaginary state walls.
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